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Policies aimed at increasing electoral competition and
campaign spending would help address low levels of voter
turnout in city elections.
In recent years commentators have become increasingly concerned with declining election
turnout across the US. The trend is nowhere more pronounced than in city mayoral elections,
where turnout is frequently as low as 25 per cent. Looking at 340 mayoral elections, Aaron C.
Weinschenk finds that turnout could be increased through increased electoral competition,
and holding votes on the same day as national elections. He also argues that encouraging
greater spending on campaigns will lead to higher levels of civic engagement and turnout in
local elections.
Scholars, journalists, policymakers, and civic groups have long expressed concern with the low levels of
voter turnout that characterize US elections, and nowhere is turnout lower than in local elections. Recently,
the issue of  low turnout has captured the attention of  a number of  local elected of f icials across the United
States. Mayor Lee Lef f ingwell of  Austin, Texas, f or example, pointed out that there is a “dangerous level of
disinterest in city elections.” A number of  studies have shown that local turnout patterns have important
polit ical consequences. For instance, low turnout in city elections appears to reduce the representation of
Latinos and Asian Americans on city councils and in the mayor’s of f ice, skew local spending policies, and
create opportunit ies f or organized interests to inf luence public policy. These concerns highlight the
importance of  understanding what inf luences voter turnout in local elections.
The problems associated with low turnout have led some mayors to speculate about its causes, and a
number of  them have even proposed policy ref orms aimed at boosting turnout in mayoral and city council
elections. For instance, in his 2011 Texas state of  the city address, Mayor Lef f ingwell outlined several
potential ways to increase local turnout, including changing the date of  local elections so that they coincide
with elections f or higher level of f ices and enhancing the ability of  local candidates to raise campaign f unds,
suggesting that local candidates need to be able to raise and spend “enough money to ef f ectively reach
anyone outside the small group of  people who regularly vote in city elections.”
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Although both scholars of  local turnout and policymakers across US cit ies have suspected that in addition
to polit ical institutions, local electoral campaigns may play a role in explaining mayoral turnout, research on
local elections has not utilized direct measures of  campaign ef f ort to investigate how much campaign
mobilization matters to local turnout. In order to learn about the f actors that inf luence turnout in US
mayoral elections, Thomas Holbrook and I constructed an original dataset containing inf ormation on
mayoral campaign activit ies (along with inf ormation on local polit ical institutions and city attributes). In total,
we gathered inf ormation on 340 U.S. mayoral elections occurring in 144 cit ies f rom 1996-2011. On average,
turnout was just 25.8 percent across the cit ies included in our study.
Our analysis revealed that local polit ical institutions, like the use of  a partisan ballot and on-cycle elections,
are important to stimulating turnout. Turnout in mayoral elections is 27 points higher in elections that
coincide with presidential elections, 15 points higher in mayoral elections that coincide with Congressional
midterm elections, and 3 points higher in cit ies that hold partisan elections rather than non-partisan
elections. Importantly, though, polit ical campaigns also play a key role in mobilizing voters in city elections,
even af ter accounting f or the ef f ects of  local institutions on turnout.
Figure 1: Effect of Total Campaign Spending on Voter Turnout
Figure 1 above illustrates the ef f ect of  mayoral campaign spending on turnout. Here, we see that there are
relatively steep increases in turnout when comparing contests with hardly any spending to those with about
$10 dollars per cit izen voting age resident, but returns f rom additional spending f latten out considerably
beyond this point. One of  the challenges f or increasing turnout in mayoral elections is that only a small
percentage (about 20 per cent in our study) of  contests f eature $10 or more of  spending per cit izen voting
age resident. Overall, the dif f erence in predicted turnout between the lowest and highest spending contests
is approximately 14 percentage points.
We also f ound that electoral competit ion was important to stimulating turnout. Turnout in contests in which
one candidate won all of  the votes (only 7 of  the 340 cases in our study) is predicted to be a about 12.5
points lower than cit ies in which the outcome is a t ie (2 cases in our dataset, due to rounding vote percent
to three places to the right of  the decimal point). This is an impressive ef f ect and points to the importance
of  a competit ive polit ical environment in stimulating turnout.
Figure 2: Differential Effects of Challenger and Incumbent Spending on Voter Turnout
We also investigated the ef f ects of  challenger and incumbent spending on turnout in mayoral elections that
f eatured an incumbent. Since incumbents are generally better known than challengers, we expected that
additional spending by incumbents would not likely reduce voter inf ormation costs very much (and theref ore
not boost turnout substantially) but that challenger spending would have a pronounced ef f ect on turnout.
Figure 2 above shows the ef f ects of  incumbent and challenger spending on turnout, and there are a couple
of  things to note. First, as was the case in Figure 1, there are diminishing returns to additional spending.
Second, incumbent spending has no ef f ect on mayoral turnout, while challenger spending has an ef f ect
very similar to that f ound in Figure 1. Shif t ing f rom the lowest to highest levels of  challenger spending
increases the rate of  turnout f rom 20 per cent to 34 per cent. Finally, the endpoints f or both the challenger
and incumbent plots highlight a f amiliar f inding: while the ef f ects of  spending are great f or challengers,
incumbents f ar exceed challengers in overall levels of  spending.
Returning to the concerns about turnout voiced by local elected of f icials, our analysis points to some
concrete, f easible actions that we are conf ident would boost local turnout levels. Implementing policies to
increase levels of  competit ion and increase the amount of  money spent on mayoral campaigns (especially
the amount spent by challengers), switching to partisan elections, and moving mayoral elections so that
they coincide with presidential or midterm elections would go a long way in increasing voter turnout.
Although some policymakers have argued f or less of  a role f or campaign spending in local elections, our
data suggest that local campaign spending mobilizes voters to turnout on Election Day. In this way,
spending plays an important role in f ostering civic engagement.
Of  course, the types of  changes suggested above are unlikely to occur. Most elected of f icials are probably
not interested in better- f inanced opponents or other instruments that would increase polit ical competit ion.
In the case of  institutional ref orms that result in low turnout (non-partisan and of f -cycle elections), the
potential ills of  low turnout need to be balanced against gains that are realized as a result insulating local
polit ics f rom national and partisan polit ics. There are clearly important tradeof f s f or policymakers to
consider.
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